| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1922 |
| DP1922 Strategic Pricing and Entry under Universal Service and Cross-Market Price Constraints | |
| Nikolaos Vettas; James J Anton; James H Vander Weide | |
| 发表日期 | 1998-07-31 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a finite number of firms, which compete imperfectly for heterogeneous workers. Firms produce a homogeneous good, sold on a competitive market, and face demand-induced price fluctuations. It is then shown that unemployment may arise in equilibrium because of both uncertainty of product demand and job mismatch. Unemployment does not arise, however, when the variance of the demand shock is small enough and/or the cost of mismatch is sufficiently low. Full employment always prevails when there is free entry. Hence, unemployment may persist as long as the incumbent firms choose their skill requirements to protect their supranormal profits. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Demand shock Job matching Unemployment Workers' and firms' heterogeneity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1922 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531059 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nikolaos Vettas,James J Anton,James H Vander Weide. DP1922 Strategic Pricing and Entry under Universal Service and Cross-Market Price Constraints. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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