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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP2075 |
DP2075 Coordination, Cooperation, Contagion and Currency Crises | |
Philippe Martin; Olivier Loisel | |
发表日期 | 1999-02-28 |
出版年 | 1999 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper investigates whether individual decisions lead to equality of opportunity in education, defined in the specific sense of irrelevance of parental income for university attendance. We show that, even if households can borrow in the capital market, the laissez-faire equilibrium exhibits an income bias, in the sense that individuals from high income households are more likely to attend university. We then study the welfare maximising policy of a utilitarian government. Its features are opposite to the free market equilibrium: with plausible assumptions, at low income levels, the tuition fee should be designed in such a way so as to create a bias in favour of low income households. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Education Student loans University |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2075 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531195 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Martin,Olivier Loisel. DP2075 Coordination, Cooperation, Contagion and Currency Crises. 1999. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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