| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP4859
|
| DP4859 Gains From Trade in Used Goods: Evidence from the Global Market for Automobiles |
| Sofronis Clerides
|
| 发表日期 | 2005-01-23
|
| 出版年 | 2005
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We analyse bidding incentives and present evidence on takeover premiums in Sweden?s mandatory bankruptcy auctions. The typical auction attracts multiple bidders and results in the firm being sold as a going concern. We model the incentive of the bankrupt firm?s main creditor (a bank) to influence the auction outcome. Rules prevent the bank from bidding directly. However, the bank often finances a bidder in the auction, relaxing liquidity constraints. We show that the optimal bid strategy for a bank-bidder coalition mimics the monopolist sales price. In the region where the bank?s debt is impaired, this optimal bid exceeds the private valuation of the bank?s coalition partner (overbidding). We derive new and testable cross-sectional predictions of the overbidding theory, and provide empirical support using auction premiums as dependent variable. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the auctions produce lower (fire-sale) premiums when economic conditions lead one to expect relatively low intra-industry auction demand. Moreover, premiums in transactions where insiders repurchase the firm (salebacks) are on average indistinguishable from premiums in sales to company outsiders, which fails to support self-dealing arguments. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the average auction producing a relatively efficient allocation of the bankrupt firm |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Bankruptcy
Auctions
Overbidding
Fire-sale
Saleback
Efficiency
Governance
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4859
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533766
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Sofronis Clerides. DP4859 Gains From Trade in Used Goods: Evidence from the Global Market for Automobiles. 2005.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
