| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5774 |
| DP5774 Procuring Innovation | |
| Luis Cabral; Giancarlo Spagnolo; Guido Cozzi; Matteo Zanza; Vincenzo Denicolò | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-07-30 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a setting in which capital taxation is characterized by two distortions working in opposite directions. On one hand, governments engage in tax competition and are tempted to lower capital tax rates. On the other hand, they are unable to commit to future policies and, once capital has been installed, have incentives to increase taxes. In this setting, there exists a tax that optimally trades off the two distortions. We compare three possible tax harmonization scenarios: no tax harmonization (all countries set taxes unilaterally), global tax harmonization (all countries coordinate their capital taxes), and partial tax harmonization (only a subset of all countries coordinate capital taxes). We show that, if capital is sufficiently mobile, partial tax harmonization benefits all countries compared to both global and no harmonization. Our analysis provides a rationale for the proposed creation of an Enhanced Cooperation Agreement on capital taxes within the European Union. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Tax competition Commitment Partial coordination |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5774 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534613 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luis Cabral,Giancarlo Spagnolo,Guido Cozzi,et al. DP5774 Procuring Innovation. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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