| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7127 |
| DP7127 Learning in Financial Markets | |
| Pietro Veronesi; Luboš Pástor | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative advertising firms may signal the quality differential. In both scenarios the firms may attempt to mislead at a cost. If firms advertise, in both scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Advertising Costly state falsification Signalling |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7127 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/535964 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pietro Veronesi,Luboš Pástor. DP7127 Learning in Financial Markets. 2009. |
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