| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w1588 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 1588 |
| Game Modelling the Tokyo Round of Tariff Negotiations | |
| Robert E. Baldwin; Richard N. Clarke | |
| 发表日期 | 1985-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1985 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using actual trade and tariff data for the United States and the European Community, this paper demonstrates how a trade negotiation such as the Tokyo Round, can be modelled as a game among countries attempting to minimize individual welfare loss functions. Once welfare functions are constructed, we compute both noncooperative and cooperative Nash equilibria. These welfare outcomes are then compared with those arising from the initial tariff structure, as well as the structure actually determined by the negotiation. We find that while the game model may track closely the decisions of the negotiators in the Tokyo Round, later unilateral political decisions resulted in less "optimal" tariffs. |
| 主题 | International Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w1588 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558827 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert E. Baldwin,Richard N. Clarke. Game Modelling the Tokyo Round of Tariff Negotiations. 1985. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w1588.pdf（310KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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