全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w3105
来源ID	Working Paper 3105
	A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness
	Alan S. Blinder; Don H. Choi
发表日期	1989-09-01
出版年	1989
语种	英语
摘要	A small interview survey was undertaken to see how actual wage-setters would react to the central. ideas of several economic theories of wage stickiness. Wage cuts were surprisingly prevalent in recent years, despite the booming economy. The strongest finding was that managers believe that perceptions of fairness play a major motivational role in labor markets; and that a "fair" wage policy is a good deal more complicated than simply not cutting wages. We also found substantial evidence for money illusion and against the adverse-selection version of the efficiency wage model.
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w3105
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560383
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Alan S. Blinder,Don H. Choi. A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness. 1989.