| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w4480 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 4480 |
| Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts | |
| George Baker; Robert Gibbons; Kevin J. Murphy | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in (respectively) implicit and explicit incentive contracts. Naturally, objective and subjective measures often are substitutes, sometimes strikingly so: we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible (because the firm's fallback position after reneging on an implicit contact is too attractive). We also show, however, that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other: if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures (because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship, and so reduce the firm's incentive to renege). We also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures, and provide case-study evidence consistent with our analyses. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4480 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561856 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | George Baker,Robert Gibbons,Kevin J. Murphy. Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts. 1993. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w4480.pdf（523KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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