全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w4723
来源ID	Working Paper 4723
	Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?
	Nancy L. Rose; Andrea Shepard
发表日期	1994-04-01
出版年	1994
语种	英语
摘要	Data for a sample of 558 CEOs over 1985-1990 suggest substantial compensation premia for managers of diversified firms. The CEO of a firm with two distinct lines of business averages 10 to 12 percent more in salary and bonus and 13 to 17 percent more in total compensation than the CEO of a similar-sized but undiversified firm, all else equal. This corresponds to average 1990 salary gains of $115,000 to $145,000 per year for our sample. Diversification may raise pay because the CEO's job requires higher ability or because it is associated with CEO entrenchment. If ability explains the correlation, we would expect the diversification premium to be invariant to tenure. Entrenchment models suggest higher premia for more experienced (more entrenched) CEOs, and an increase in compensation when the CEO diversifies the firm. The data support an ability model over an entrenchment explanation. The diversification premium is unaffected by tenure, and increasing diversification reduces compensation for incumbent CEOs, all else equal.
主题	Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w4723
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562117
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Nancy L. Rose,Andrea Shepard. Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?. 1994.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w4723.pdf（382KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览