| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w4976
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 4976
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| CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures |
| Paul L. Joskow; Nancy L. Rose
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| 发表日期 | 1994-12-01
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| 出版年 | 1994
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Corporate Finance
; Labor Economics
; Labor Compensation
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w4976
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562399
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Paul L. Joskow,Nancy L. Rose. CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures. 1994.
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文件名：
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w4976.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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