全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w4980
来源ID	Working Paper 4980
	Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry
	Paul L. Joskow; Nancy L. Rose; Catherin D. Wolfram
发表日期	1994-12-01
出版年	1994
语种	英语
摘要	This study explores the effect of regulatory and political constraints on the level of CEO compensation for 87 state-regulated electric utilities during 1978-1990. The results suggest that political pressures may constrain top executive pay levels in this industry. First, CEOs of firms operating in regulatory environments characterized by investment banks as relatively `pro-consumer' receive lower compensation than do CEOs of firms in environments ranked as more friendly to investors. Second, CEO pay is lower for utilities with relatively high or rising rates, or a higher proportion of industrial sales, consistent with earlier research that describes political pressures on electricity rates. Finally, attributes of the commission appointment and tenure rules affect CEO compensation in ways consistent with the political constraint hypothesis: for example, pay is lower in states with elected commissioners than in states where commissioners are appointed by the governor, all else equal. Despite apparently effective pressure to constrain pay levels in this sector, however, we find no evidence of related intra-industry variation in the sensitivity of pay to firm financial performance.
主题	Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Firm Behavior
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w4980
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/562403
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Paul L. Joskow,Nancy L. Rose,Catherin D. Wolfram. Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry. 1994.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w4980.pdf（424KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览