| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w5796
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 5796
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| Paying for Health Insurance: The Tradeoff between Competition and Adverse Selection |
| David M. Cutler; Sarah Reber
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| 发表日期 | 1996-10-01
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| 出版年 | 1996
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper uses data on health insurance choices by employees of Harvard University to examine the effect of alternative pricing rules on market equilibrium. In the mid-1990s, Harvard moved from a system of subsidizing more expensive insurance to a system of contributing an equal amount to each plan. We estimate a substantial demand response to the policy change, with a short-run elasticity of about -2. The reform also induced substantial" adverse selection. Because of this selection, the long-run demand response is three times the short-run response. Price variation induced by adverse selection is inefficient; we estimate the magnitude of the welfare loss from adverse selection at 2 percent of baseline health spending. Finally, as insurance choice was made more competitive, premiums to Harvard fell relative to premiums in the Boston area by nearly 10 percent. This savings was large enough to compensate for the inefficiency induced by adverse selection, so that reform overall was welfare enhancing. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w5796
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563285
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
David M. Cutler,Sarah Reber. Paying for Health Insurance: The Tradeoff between Competition and Adverse Selection. 1996.
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文件名：
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w5796.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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