| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6177 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6177 |
| Implicit Contracts and the Theory of the Firm | |
| George Baker; Robert Gibbons; Kevin J. Murphy | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the role of implicit contracts' (that is, informal agreements supported by" reputation rather than law) both within firms, for example in employment relationships between them, for example as hand-in-glove supplier relationships. We find that the optimal" organizational form is determined largely by what implicit contracts it facilitates. Among other" things, we also show that vertical integration is an efficient response to widely varying supply" prices. Finally, our model suggests why management' (that is, the development and" implementation of unwritten rules and codes of conduct) is essential in organizations. " |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6177 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/563685 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | George Baker,Robert Gibbons,Kevin J. Murphy. Implicit Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6177.pdf（1387KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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