全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Tough Policies, Incredible Policies?

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w9932
来源ID	Working Paper 9932
	Tough Policies, Incredible Policies?
	Andres Velasco; Alejandro Neut
发表日期	2003-09-01
出版年	2003
语种	英语
摘要	We revisit the question of what determines the credibility of macroeconomic policies here, of promises to repay public debt. Almost all thinking on the issue has focused on governments' strategic decision to default (or erode the value of outstanding debt via inflation/devaluation). But sometimes governments default not because they want to, but because they cannot avoid it: adverse shocks leave them no option. We build a model in which default/devaluation can occur deliberately (for strategic reasons) or unavoidably. If such unavoidable fiscal crises a) have pecuniary costs and b) occur with possible probability, much conventional wisdom on the determinantes of credibility need no longer hold. For instance, appointing a conservative policymaker or denominating public debt in foreign currency may reduce, not increase, credibility.
主题	Macroeconomics ; International Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w9932
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567557
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Andres Velasco,Alejandro Neut. Tough Policies, Incredible Policies?. 2003.