| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w10443
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 10443
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| The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass |
| Olivier Blanchard; Jean Tirole
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| 发表日期 | 2004-04-19
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| 出版年 | 2004
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Much of the policy discussion of labor market institutions has been at the margin, with proposals to tighten unemployment benefits, reduce employment protection, and so on. There has been little discussion however of what the ultimate goal and architecture should be. The paper focuses on characterizing this ultimate goal, the optimal architecture of labor market institutions. We start our analysis with a simple benchmark, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms and random shocks to productivity. In this benchmark, we show that optimality requires both unemployment insurance and employment protection---in the form of layoff taxes; it also requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the architecture must be modified in each case. The scope for insurance may be more limited than in the benchmark; so may the scope for employment protection. The general principle remains however, namely the need to look at unemployment insurance and employment protection together, rather than in isolation. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Welfare and Collective Choice
; Macroeconomics
; Fiscal Policy
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10443
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568072
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Olivier Blanchard,Jean Tirole. The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass. 2004.
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文件名：
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w10443.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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