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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w15115
来源IDWorking Paper 15115
Capital Income Taxes with Heterogeneous Discount Rates
Peter A. Diamond; Johannes Spinnewijn
发表日期2009-06-30
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要With heterogeneity in both skills and discount factors, the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem that savings should not be taxed does not hold. We consider a model with heterogeneity of preferences at each earnings level. With some assumptions on the equilibrium, a small savings tax on high earners and a small savings subsidy on low earners both increase welfare, regardless of the correlation between ability and discount factor. Key is that types who value future consumption less are more tempted to switch to a lower paid job. Extending Saez (2002), a uniform savings tax increases welfare if the correlation of skill with discount factor is su¢ ciently high. Some optimal tax results and empirical evidence to support the assumptions are presented.
主题Public Economics ; Taxation
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w15115
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572790
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GB/T 7714
Peter A. Diamond,Johannes Spinnewijn. Capital Income Taxes with Heterogeneous Discount Rates. 2009.
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