全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w15586
来源ID	Working Paper 15586
	Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
	Alma Cohen; Peter Siegelman
发表日期	2009-12-17
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	This paper reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage-risk prediction of adverse selection theory--that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage-risk correlation may be found in some pools of insurance policies but not in others. We also review the work on the disentangling of adverse selection and moral hazard and on learning by policyholders and insurers.
主题	Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w15586
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573262
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Alma Cohen,Peter Siegelman. Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets. 2009.