| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17847 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17847 |
| Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders | |
| Alessandra Casella; Thomas Palfrey; Sébastien Turban | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-16 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions. In both cases, trading falls short of full efficiency, but for opposite reasons: with group leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with market trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with group leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade; with market trades, vote trading can be welfare reducing. All predictions are strongly supported by experimental results. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17847 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575523 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Thomas Palfrey,Sébastien Turban. Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17847.pdf（718KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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