| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20411 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20411 |
| Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets | |
| Neale Mahoney; E. Glen Weyl | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-08-21 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Standard policies to correct market power and selection can be misguided when these two forces co-exist. Using a calibrated model of employer-sponsored health insurance, we show that the risk adjustment commonly used by employers to offset adverse selection often reduces the amount of high-quality coverage and thus social surplus. Conversely, in a model of subprime auto lending calibrated to Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2012), realistic levels of competition among lenders generate a significant oversupply of credit, implying greater market power is desirable. We build a model of symmetric imperfect competition in selection markets that parameterizes the degree of both market power and selection and use graphical price-theoretic reasoning to provide a general analysis of the interaction between selection and imperfect competition. We use the same logic to show that in selection markets four principles of the United States Horizontal Merger Guidelines are often reversed. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20411 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578085 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Neale Mahoney,E. Glen Weyl. Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets. 2014. |
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