| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20760 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20760 |
| Competition and Bank Opacity | |
| Liangliang Jiang; Ross Levine; Chen Lin | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-12-22 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public and regulators? We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results indicate that competition reduces bank opacity, enhancing the ability of markets and regulators to monitor banks. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20760 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578435 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Liangliang Jiang,Ross Levine,Chen Lin. Competition and Bank Opacity. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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