G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w21361
来源IDWorking Paper 21361
Long Run Effects of Temporary Incentives on Medical Care Productivity
Pablo Celhay; Paul Gertler; Paula Giovagnoli; Christel Vermeersch
发表日期2015-07-20
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要The adoption of new clinical practice patterns by medical care providers is often challenging, even when they are believed to be both efficacious and profitable. This paper uses a randomized field experiment to examine the effects of temporary financial incentives paid to medical care clinics for the initiation of prenatal care in the first trimester of pregnancy. The rate of early initiation of prenatal care was 34% higher in the treatment group than in the control group while the incentives were being paid, and this effect persisted at least 24 months or more after the incentives ended. These results are consistent with a model where the incentives enable providers to address the fixed costs of overcoming organizational inertia in innovation, and suggest that temporary incentives may be effective at motivating improvements in long run provider performance at a substantially lower cost than permanent incentives.
主题Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w21361
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579034
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Pablo Celhay,Paul Gertler,Paula Giovagnoli,et al. Long Run Effects of Temporary Incentives on Medical Care Productivity. 2015.
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