| 来源类型 | Research Reports
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| ISBN | 9780833087775
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| 来源ID | RR-768-RC
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| Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn |
| David C. Gompert; Hans Binnendijk; Bonny Lin
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| 发表日期 | 2014
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| 出版年 | 2014
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| 页码 | 328
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 结论 |
Strategic Blunders Can Happen When Leaders Rely on Defective Cognitive Models of Reality and Have No One to Correct Them.- Strategic blunders can result from faulty intuition, egotism, arrogance, hubris, grand but flawed strategic ideas, underestimating the enemy and the difficulties and duration of conflict, overconfidence in war plans, ignoring what could go wrong, stifling debate, shunning independent advice, and penalizing dissent.
- These conditions are especially dangerous when combined with excessive risk taking based on an overestimation of one's ability to control events.
The Key to Bridging the Gap Between a Defective Model and Objective Reality Is Information, Amply Supplied and Well Used.- Decisionmakers may be more receptive to information that supports rather than threatens their beliefs, preconceptions, and models.
- Institutions close to decisionmakers can be drawn into the same subjective perception of reality.
- Government institutions are not dependable safeguards against strategic mistakes.
- Improvements are needed in how leaders and institutions use information so that better cognitive models will enable them to make better choices.
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| 摘要 |
- Form a strategic advisory body within the National Security Council with access to all intelligence and the best possible analytic capabilities. This body would be obligated to provide the President and the rest of the National Security Council with impartial analysis of underlying beliefs, objectives, assumptions, estimates of the adversary, prospects for success, options, contingencies, and risks. The process would be covered by executive privilege, but the body's output would be a matter of historical and eventually public record.
- The strategic advisory body should set and insist on the highest standards of analytic objectivity and rigor. The entity would be responsible for reviewing the integrity of the analysis conducted by the institutions responsible for staffing the decisionmaker (such as the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council).
- The independent analysis performed for and by the strategic advisory body should make use of proven enhancements in analyst-computer teaming capabilities and methods.
- The presidents of the United States and China should form the sort of relationship that goes well beyond occasional summits and having a hotline. The two need a facility for communication and a rapport.
- Institutional connections between the United States and China should go beyond the existing U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue with the goal of mining information from institutional links that can correct errors in models of reality and prevent blunders.
- Intellectual connectivity should continue to expand, especially as it involves Chinese and American strategic communities.
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| 主题 | Assumption Based Planning
; China
; Decisionmaking
; Intelligence Community
; International Diplomacy
; United States
; Warfare and Military Operations
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| URL | https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR768.html
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| 来源智库 | RAND Corporation (United States)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/107735
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
David C. Gompert,Hans Binnendijk,Bonny Lin. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn. 2014.
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