来源类型 | Research Reports
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规范类型 | 报告
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ISBN | 9780833082190
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来源ID | RR-392-AF
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| The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 |
| Eric Heginbotham; Michael Nixon; Forrest E. Morgan; Jacob Heim; Jeff Hagen; Sheng Tao Li; Jeffrey Engstrom; Martin C. Libicki; Paul DeLuca; David A. Shlapak; et al.
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发表日期 | 2015
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出版年 | 2015
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页码 | 430
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语种 | 英语
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结论 |
Although China's Capabilities Fall Behind Those of the United States, It Is Now Able to Pose Significant Challenges to U.S. Operations- China has made tremendous strides in its military capabilities since 1996. It is not close to catching up to the U.S. military in terms of aggregate capabilities, but it does not need to catch up to challenge the United States on its immediate periphery.
- Despite U.S. military improvements, China has made relative gains in most operational areas, in some cases with startling speed. However, trends vary by mission area, and even in the context of difficult scenarios, U.S. forces retain some important advantages.
Distance and Geography Have Major Impacts on Both Sides' Ability to Achieve Their Critical Objectives- In general, these factors work against the United States and largely counterbalance U.S. military strengths, especially in scenarios around China's immediate periphery.
- China's ability to project power to more distant locations remains weak, and the United States continues to hold more decisive advantage in Asian scenarios at a distance from China's coast.
- However, China's ability to project power is improving, and the relative balance in areas more distant from China is also shifting.
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摘要 |
- U.S. military leaders should ensure that U.S. planning for Pacific military operations is as dynamic as possible. The U.S. military should adopt operational concepts and strategies that capitalize on potential advantages and utilize the geographic size and depth of the theater, as well as areas of particular U.S. military strength.
- Specifically, the U.S. military should consider employing an active denial strategy that would improve the resiliency of the force and diminish its vulnerability to preemptive attack. Forces would be more dispersed at the outset of conflict, with many deployed at greater distances from China, but with the ability to move forward as Chinese missile inventories are exhausted or reduced through attrition.
- Military procurement priorities should be adjusted, emphasizing base redundancy and survivability; standoff systems optimized for high-intensity conflict; stealthy, survivable fighters and bombers; submarine and anti-submarine warfare; and robust space and counterspace capabilities. To save money, U.S. decisionmakers should consider more rapid cuts to legacy fighter forces and a decreased emphasis on large aircraft carriers.
- Political and military leaders should intensify diplomatic efforts in the Pacific and Southeast Asia with the goal of expanding potential U.S. access in wartime. This will provide greater strategic depth and more options for U.S. forces.
- Western governments and commentators should make it clear to China that aggression would carry immense risks and that China should be cautious not to exaggerate its ability to prevail in armed conflict. They should also engage China on issues of strategic stability and escalation.
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主题 | Air Defense
; Air Warfare
; Antisubmarine Warfare
; Cyber Warfare
; Global Security
; Nuclear Weapons and Warfare
; Space Warfare
; Spratly Islands
; Submarines
; Taiwan
; United States
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URL | https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html
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来源智库 | RAND Corporation (United States)
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资源类型 | 智库出版物
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条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/107937
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推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 |
Eric Heginbotham,Michael Nixon,Forrest E. Morgan,等. The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017. 2015.
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