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Airpower Prevented an Early Regime Victory

• The air campaign enabled the opposition to survive Qaddafi's offensive in March 2011.
• Imposition of the no-fly zone and the continuation of coalition air strikes had a profound effect on the Libyan rebels beyond the protection those strikes provided from air and ground attacks.

Airpower Enabled Rebels to Go on the Offensive

• Aerial intervention made possible not merely a victory against Qaddafi, but a Libyan victory.
• The availability of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, especially of developed targets, was central to the conduct of the air campaign.

Intervention Was Done Cheaply and Effectively

• No coalition personnel were killed, or even seriously wounded, carrying out operations over (or in) Libya.
• Target planners and aircrews generally succeeded in their considerable efforts to avoid civilian casualties.
• The war is estimated to have cost the coalition several billion dollars, a relatively low figure compared to other conflicts.
• Several nations' air forces were stretched to the limit of their abilities to sustain aircraft deployments.

Airpower Was Intertwined With Politics

• The Libyan aerial intervention was unusual in having a rationale that explicitly revolved around a mandate to protect civilians.
• The Arab states' most important strategic contribution was in the political domain and in providing assistance to the Libyan rebels.
• The United Nations' endorsement of the intervention heavily influenced the participation of some countries.
• Applying the "Libya model" of using airpower to enable victories by indigenous ground forces to other settings is potentially powerful but will often be more difficult, especially where political conditions are less favorable than in Libya.