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Dilemmas for U.S. Decisionmakers

• In a crisis involving the United States and a nuclear-armed regional adversary, the United States would need to try to (1) avoid driving the adversary across its nuclear threshold, (2) reassure vulnerable partners, (3) persuade other powerful actors to exercise restraint, (4) deter further nuclear use if the adversary crosses the nuclear threshold in some way, and (5) decide whether to attempt to neutralize the threat.

Can the United States Neutralize a Regional Opponent's Nuclear Capabilities?

• A regional adversary is most vulnerable to U.S. efforts to neutralize its nuclear capabilities when it has just developed or otherwise acquired its first handful of weapons, and much less so once it has capabilities for delivering nuclear weapons via ballistic missiles.
• There is probably no case in which U.S. forces could neutralize an opponent's nuclear capabilities with a high enough probability of success that U.S. leaders would let them attempt it.
• To restore the credibility of future nuclear deterrent threats, if an adversary were to use nuclear weapons, the United States would have to respond in a decisive way.

Managing Escalation in Conventional Wars with Nuclear-Armed Opponents

• U.S. forces should be able to manage escalation in some conventional conflicts as long as the United States does not threaten survival of the regime or its nuclear deterrent forces.
• U.S. leaders must deter the adversary from escalating above critical U.S. thresholds and manage U.S. forces to avoid inadvertent and accidental escalation.