来源类型 | Research Reports
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规范类型 | 报告
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DOI | https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1176
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ISBN | 9780833092380
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来源ID | RR-1176-OSD
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| Defense Institution Building: An Assessment |
| Walter L. Perry; Stuart Johnson; Stephanie Pezard; Gillian S. Oak; David Stebbins; Chaoling Feng
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发表日期 | 2016
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出版年 | 2016
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页码 | 290
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语种 | 英语
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结论 |
Defense institution building roles and responsibilities are not adequately defined at the program and project levels.
- Roles and responsibilities are either not defined at all, or the relationships are so complex that organizations resort to ad hoc relationships based, at times, on personalities.
- In particular, the relationship among the regional centers, combatant commands, and DIB programs is not adequately defined in current policy or guidance documents.
Involvement of partner nations in setting DIB objectives at the combatant command level is inconsistent.
DIB programs have developed processes for selecting countries and prioritizing their DIB activities.
More and better coordination mechanisms are needed to avoid the implementation of redundant security cooperation programs.
The principle of "unity of command" is lacking in the DIB community.
Although the entire DIB community has expended considerable effort at developing suitable methods to measure the progress of their investments, there is some unevenness in the approaches.
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摘要 |
- Take account of the partner nation's level of capability and willingness to make effective use of the assistance offered when determining the U.S. level of involvement.
- DIB programs should establish a routine consultation process that ensures all affected parties can contribute to the selection of planned DIB investments.
- Create a clearinghouse, either from the current entities that oversee one or more DIB programs, or ex-nihilo. Also, increase the impact of combatant command conferences by expanding the agenda to include an assessment of all security cooperation programs.
- There should be a single entity between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commands responsible for managing all DIB program activities. A DIB Enterprise Director should be appointed to serve as a bridge linking policy to program to project-level DIB.
- To the extent possible, (1) objective monitoring processes should be implemented for all DIB activities, (2) CCMDs should develop a strategy aimed at achieving DIB goals and objectives over a long period, (3) evaluation processes should focus on both the effectiveness of DIB investments and how well they are performed, (4) suitable standards or criteria should be established to evaluate both the effectiveness and performance of DIB activities, and (5) a mechanism needs to be in place to terminate or significantly alter an ongoing DID activity if necessary.
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主题 | Capacity Building
; Civil-Military Relations
; Operational Readiness
; Security Cooperation
; United States Department of Defense
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URL | https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1176.html
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来源智库 | RAND Corporation (United States)
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引用统计 |
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资源类型 | 智库出版物
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条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/108238
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推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 |
Walter L. Perry,Stuart Johnson,Stephanie Pezard,et al. Defense Institution Building: An Assessment. 2016.
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