G2TT
来源类型Research Reports
规范类型报告
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7249/RR1820
ISBN9780833097460
来源IDRR-1820-A
What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/Area Denial Forces Play in Deterring or Defeating Aggression?
Timothy M. Bonds; Joel B. Predd; Timothy R. Heath; Michael S. Chase; Michael Johnson; Michael J. Lostumbo; James Bonomo; Muharrem Mane; Paul S. Steinberg
发表日期2017
出版年2017
页码198
语种英语
结论

The United States and Its Allies Can Adopt Several Strategies to Counter an Adversary's Aggression When Shielded by A2/AD Capabilities

  • A proven approach is to establish regional bases from which to operate land, air, and maritime forces projected from the United States, but it would be very difficult to successfully employ a similar strategy against peer or near-peer military forces.
  • Imposing A2/AD challenges on enemies would allow allied forces to contest maritime areas without exposing U.S. forces to easy attack.
  • A2/AD capabilities might be a particularly effective way to raise the costs for aggression. U.S. allies and partners could field a mix of anti-ship, anti-aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles to impose the same problems on adversaries threatening them with attack over water. The U.S. joint force could provide support — and potentially reinforcements — to its allies.
  • A2/AD concepts shift the primary responsibility for defense to U.S. allies and partners.

Ground-Based A2/AD Missions Include Anti-Ship Missions, Surface-to-Surface Missions, and Short-Range Air and Cruise Missile Defense Missions

  • Threats in the Pacific theater clearly demand that the United States and its allies and partners possess anti-ship capabilities.
  • Surface-to-surface strike is a critical capability to conduct counterbattery fires against enemy anti-ship missile batteries, long-range anti-aircraft missile systems, and adversary air and sea bases.
  • The demands for air and cruise missile defense are great in the western Pacific, owing both to the threat posed by the large Chinese investment in cruise missiles and to emerging joint operational concepts that geographically disperse air bases. The same is likely true to an even greater extent in Eastern Europe in potential operations against Russia.
摘要
  • The Army should organize and field a prototype multi-domain fires battalion to develop, test, and exercise joint and combined defensive concepts.
  • Long-range intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and targeting capabilities should be provided by existing U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and allied systems.
  • For the anti-ship role, an initial capability should be established by building a combined battalion incorporating existing anti-ship missile batteries operated by selected allies, such as Poland and Japan. Additional allies should seek to join as they develop the requisite capabilities.
  • If current development programs succeed in building versions of the Army Tactical Missile System or the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System with a terminal guidance package for anti-ship operations, the multi-domain battalion should incorporate a U.S. Army anti-ship battery capable of operating them.
  • An existing High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System battery should be assigned to provide surface-to-surface fires.
  • A short-range air and cruise missile defense battery could be assigned from the forces being formed to operate the Indirect Fire Protection Capability–Increment 2.
  • To provide a capability that can operate in small numbers, the U.S. Army should develop and deploy minimum engagement packages for exercises and demonstrations with allies and partners.
  • After an initial set of joint operating concepts has been developed, the Army should work with key allies and partners to build combined concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
主题Air Defense ; Ballistic Missiles ; China ; Japan ; Land Warfare ; Military Strategy ; Missile Defense ; Russia ; United States ; United States Army
URLhttps://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1820.html
来源智库RAND Corporation (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/108518
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Timothy M. Bonds,Joel B. Predd,Timothy R. Heath,et al. What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/Area Denial Forces Play in Deterring or Defeating Aggression?. 2017.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
x1495461296810.jpg(10KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
RAND_RR1820.pdf(3393KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Timothy M. Bonds]的文章
[Joel B. Predd]的文章
[Timothy R. Heath]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Timothy M. Bonds]的文章
[Joel B. Predd]的文章
[Timothy R. Heath]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Timothy M. Bonds]的文章
[Joel B. Predd]的文章
[Timothy R. Heath]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: x1495461296810.jpg
格式: JPEG
文件名: RAND_RR1820.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。