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来源类型 | Research Brief |
规范类型 | 简报 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.7249/RB9649 |
来源ID | RB-9649 |
No Evidence That Incentive Pay for Teacher Teams Improves Student Outcomes: Results from a Randomized Trial | |
Matthew G. Springer; John F. Pane; Vi-Nhuan Le; Daniel F. McCaffrey; Susan Freeman Burns; Laura S. Hamilton; Brian M. Stecher | |
发表日期 | 2012-05-30 |
出版年 | 2012 |
页码 | 2 |
语种 | 英语 |
结论 | AbstractResearchers examined whether rewarding teams of teachers for student performance had an effect on student achievement or teacher practices or attitudes in a demonstration project in Round Rock, Texas. They found that the intervention had no effect in any of these areas. Students taught by teacher teams who were offered incentives scored slightly better on some standardized tests, but the differences were small and not statistically significant. |
主题 | Academic Achievement ; Educational Program Evaluation ; Pay for Performance in Education ; Teacher Effectiveness ; Teacher Incentives ; Teachers and Teaching |
URL | https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9649.html |
来源智库 | RAND Corporation (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/110420 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew G. Springer,John F. Pane,Vi-Nhuan Le,et al. No Evidence That Incentive Pay for Teacher Teams Improves Student Outcomes: Results from a Randomized Trial. 2012. |
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research_briefs.gif(3KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
RAND_RB9649.pdf(108KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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