G2TT
来源类型Research Brief
规范类型简报
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7249/RB9649
来源IDRB-9649
No Evidence That Incentive Pay for Teacher Teams Improves Student Outcomes: Results from a Randomized Trial
Matthew G. Springer; John F. Pane; Vi-Nhuan Le; Daniel F. McCaffrey; Susan Freeman Burns; Laura S. Hamilton; Brian M. Stecher
发表日期2012-05-30
出版年2012
页码2
语种英语
结论

Abstract

Researchers examined whether rewarding teams of teachers for student performance had an effect on student achievement or teacher practices or attitudes in a demonstration project in Round Rock, Texas. They found that the intervention had no effect in any of these areas. Students taught by teacher teams who were offered incentives scored slightly better on some standardized tests, but the differences were small and not statistically significant.

主题Academic Achievement ; Educational Program Evaluation ; Pay for Performance in Education ; Teacher Effectiveness ; Teacher Incentives ; Teachers and Teaching
URLhttps://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9649.html
来源智库RAND Corporation (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/110420
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GB/T 7714
Matthew G. Springer,John F. Pane,Vi-Nhuan Le,et al. No Evidence That Incentive Pay for Teacher Teams Improves Student Outcomes: Results from a Randomized Trial. 2012.
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