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Key Findings

U.S. security sector assistance (SSA) has a mixed record in Africa:

1. In the Cold War, SSA appears to have increased the incidence of civil wars.
2. In the post–Cold War era, SSA appears to have had little or no net effect on political violence.
3. In peacekeeping contexts, however, SSA appears to have reduced the incidence of civil wars, terrorism, and state repression.

Many of the practices associated with SSA in peacekeeping contexts might be adopted in other environments.

The United States has sought to combat security threats in Africa — whether terrorism or, in a previous era, communism — principally by providing security sector assistance (SSA) to partner governments on the continent.^[1] Proponents of such assistance claim that it is a cost-effective tool for advancing U.S. interests on the continent while being welcomed by the African partners. By strengthening partners' security capabilities, the United States can help partners deter challenges by militants and degrade and ultimately defeat those challengers that do arise. Moreover, by professionalizing and socializing partner security personnel, the United States can stabilize governments through improved civil–military relations and human-rights practices.^[2] Critics, on the other hand, contend that SSA has been at best ineffective, leading to brief but unsustainable improvements in security, or at worst detrimental in undercutting precisely the goals the United States has tried to achieve by inflaming inter-communal tensions, undermining civil–military relations, or contributing to human-rights abuses.