| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Electoral Mechanisms and Pressure Groups: The Mix of Direct and Indirect Taxation |
| Gianluca Fiorentini
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| 发表日期 | 1997
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 1997
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper describes the fiscal structure of a community as an equilibrium of a non-cooperative game where members of different pressure groups - characterised by conflicting interests - compete to get distributive gains. Their interaction is regulated by a constitution which sets the electoral rules and the institutional framework in which pressure groups' activities take place. We focus on how the equilibrium mix of direct and indirect taxation is determined in a community divided into two groups working in different sectors which we label regular and shadow sectors, respectively. Our main aim is to investigate the relations between the relative scale of the shadow sector, the fiscal equilibrium between direct and indirect taxation, and the constitutional setting. In this respect we show that the constitutional settings in which the main legislative body is chosen through a strictly proportional electoral rule tend to determine a fiscal equilibrium with a greater emphasis on direct taxation and this in turn gives greater incentives to enlarge the shadow sector. The paper provides empirical evidence on 21 OECD countries for the period 1970-90 on the relevance of the features of the electoral mechanisms on the fiscal mix between direct and indirect taxation. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/electoral-mechanisms-and-pressure-groups-the-mix-of-direct-and-indirect-taxation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116227
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Gianluca Fiorentini. Electoral Mechanisms and Pressure Groups: The Mix of Direct and Indirect Taxation. 1997.
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文件名：
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NDL1997-028.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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