| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| The Optimal Enforcement of Antitrust Law |
| Michele Polo
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| 发表日期 | 1997
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 1997
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper analyses the optimal enforcement of competition policy against collusion under asymmetric information on cartel's costs and observable prices. The implementable price schedules are increasing, and the net profits decreasing, in cartel's costs, while expected penalties are increasing in observed prices. Hence, more efficient cartels enjoy positive (informational) rents. The optimal price schedule is higher than marginal costs even when enforcement is costless: since penalties can be at best zero, informational rents for more efficient types must be created through price-cost margins. This allocative distortion is lower for more efficient types, while full collusion can be tolerated for high cost cartels. Costly enforcement tends to reduce this distortion for less efficient types. Comparing antitrust enforcement with regulation, we find that regulation with positive transfers is better than antitrust enforcement, which however allows to implement more efficient outcomes than regulations without transfers. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-optimal-enforcement-of-antitrust-law/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116233
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Michele Polo. The Optimal Enforcement of Antitrust Law. 1997.
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文件名：
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NDL1997-034.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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