| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Provision of Quality and Certification Intermediaries | |
| Gian Luigi Albano; Alessandro Lizzeri | |
| 发表日期 | 1997 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | If buyers do not observe the quality of a product and production of quality is costly, market allocations can be very inefficient. Certification intermediaries are institutions that provide information about quality to buyers. The amount of information in the market determines the incentives that producers have to provide high quality goods. In this paper, we model information revelation as a strategic variable of intermediaries. The amount of disclosed information is shown to deeply influence both the intermediary's profits and the distribution of quality produced in equilibrium. We show that a monopoly intermediary will provide noisy signals of quality and that the quality produced in equilibrium is the same as the one that would be chosen by a monopsonistic buyer who optimally designs a mechanism. Efficiency is increased by the intermediary but less quality is produced in equilibrium than under complete information. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D82,L15 |
| 关键词 | Information revelation,Disclosure rule,Certification |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/provision-of-quality-and-certification-intermediaries/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116236 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gian Luigi Albano,Alessandro Lizzeri. Provision of Quality and Certification Intermediaries. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1997-037.pdf（410KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
