| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Strategic Behaviour of Polluters During the Transition from Standard-Setting to Permits Trading | |
| Eftichios S. Sartzetakis; Benoit Laplante; Anastasios P. Xepapadeas | |
| 发表日期 | 1997 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Grandfathering of emission permits creates a rent to incumbent firms since a valuable asset is freely distributed to them. In this paper, we examine the strategic behaviour of polluters that anticipate a change in environmental regulation from a standard-setting to tradable emission permits with grandfathering. We focus on the impact of firms' rent-reeking activities on social welfare. We show that anticipation of the change in environmental regulation has two effects: a distributional effect which reduces, or completely eliminates, the distributional bias towards incumbent firms inherent to the grandfathering system and an efficiency effect resulting from the increase in aggregate output and emissions during the base period. Social welfare may increase as a result of the strategic manipulation of emissions. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/strategic-behaviour-of-polluters-during-the-transition-from-standard-setting-to-permits-trading/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116242 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eftichios S. Sartzetakis,Benoit Laplante,Anastasios P. Xepapadeas. Strategic Behaviour of Polluters During the Transition from Standard-Setting to Permits Trading. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1997-043.pdf（136KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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