| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in Italy | |
| Giorgio Brunello; Clara Graziano; Bruno Parigi | |
| 发表日期 | 1997 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the determinants of executive pay in a sample of Italian firms. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study on the compensation of Italian executives. We estimate that an increase of real profits per firm by 1 billion lire increases the pay of top executives by only 504 thousand lire, more than the increase found for middle management (184 thousand). Pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in firms where profits are declining and profit variability is relatively low. This sensitivity is lower in domestic-owned firms and in firms that are not affiliated to a multinational group, a result consistent with the main features of Italian capitalism. |
| 特色分类 | D82,J33 |
| 关键词 | Executive compensation,Principal-agent |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/executive-compensation-and-firm-performance-in-italy/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116249 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giorgio Brunello,Clara Graziano,Bruno Parigi. Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in Italy. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1997-050.pdf（102KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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