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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Multiple Versus Single Banking Relationships | |
Luigi Guiso; Enrica Detragiache; Paolo G. Garella | |
发表日期 | 1997 |
出处 | Economy and Society |
出版年 | 1997 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We develop a theoretical model in which firms may choose multiple banking relationships to reduce the risk that financing will be denied by "relationship banks" should the latter experience liquidity problems and refuse to roll over lines of credit. The inability to refinance from relationship banks signals unfavorable information about the quality of the firm's project, which may also prevent the firm from obtaining credit from other banks. We show that if this "lemons" problem is severe, then it is optimal to establish a relationship with more than one bank in spite of higher transaction costs; if it is mild, a single banking relationship is optimal. We find that the severity of the lemons problem depends directly on the inefficiency of bankruptcy procedures and inversely on the "fragility" of the banking system. The paper concludes with a comparison of bank-firm relationships in Italy and the U.S., characterized respectively by multiple and single banking. We present evidence that bankruptcy costs are significantly higher and banks less fragile in Italy than in the U.S., suggesting that the factors identified by the theoretical model are relevant in practice. |
特色分类 | G21,G30,G33 |
关键词 | Multiple banking,Relationship banking,Corporate finance |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/multiple-versus-single-banking-relationships/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116263 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luigi Guiso,Enrica Detragiache,Paolo G. Garella. Multiple Versus Single Banking Relationships. 1997. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL1997-064.pdf(230KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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