| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation When Polluters Might Cooperate | |
| Katti Millock; François Salanié | |
| 发表日期 | 1997 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse the regulation of nonpoint source pollution. In particular, we study the use of peer monitoring to sustain co-operative abatement by a group of polluters. Delegation to a group of polluters has sometimes been proposed under a policy of so called voluntary abatement accords. By solving the problem of a regulator who a priori does not know whether agents are co-operative or not, we explain some features of voluntary abatement accords. The analysis shows that the policy measure proposed in the literature for nonpoint source regulation - an ambient tax - may not be efficient. |
| 特色分类 | D82,H41,Q25,Q28 |
| 关键词 | Peer monitoring,Co-operation,Voluntary abatement accords,Environmental regulation,Ambient tax,Incomplete information |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/nonpoint-source-pollution-regulation-when-polluters-might-cooperate/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116281 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Katti Millock,François Salanié. Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation When Polluters Might Cooperate. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1997-082.pdf（76KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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