| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| An Option Approach to Water Delegation |
| Gérard Mondello; Ephraim Clark
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| 发表日期 | 1997
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 1997
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The problem that we address in this paper stems from the trend to delegation in the water management field. The problem that we address refers to the municipality's negotiating disadvantage in the face of some cartelized water management. We discuss the specific characteristics of the delegation auction that render it useless as a tool for collective welfare maximisation. We show that the remaining tool for achieving collective welfare maximisation, i.e. the municipality's right to revoke delegation and return to direct management, is also ineffective due to a lack of credibility that is essentially financial in nature. Thus, if the credibility of revocation could be restored, the municipality's bargaining power could also be restored. Using standard methods of stochastic calculus, we model the municipality's right of revocation as a call option held by the municipality. We show that the value of this option depends to a large extent on the exercise price, which is partly determined by objective economic criteria and partly by legal and institutional conventions. Based on this we suggest that credibility could be restored by the constitution of a fund at least as large as the effective exercise price. |
| 特色分类 | Q25,O33,G13
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| 关键词 | Delegation,Water management,Auctions and bids
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/an-option-approach-to-water-delegation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116284
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Gérard Mondello,Ephraim Clark. An Option Approach to Water Delegation. 1997.
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文件名：
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NDL1997-085.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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