| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Information Asymmetries, Uncertainties and Cleanup Delays at Superfund Sites | |
| Leo K. Simon; Gordon C. Rausser; Jinhua Zhao | |
| 发表日期 | 1997 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Superfund cleanup has been extremely slow. Traditional analysis has centred around reducing the heavy negotiation and litigation to expedite the cleanup process. This paper investigates other factors which provide possible incentives for the PRPs to delay the cleanup, namely discounting, risk aversion, and compensation for off-site damage. Liability share is found to play an essential role in PRP's incentives to delay. Commonly adopted EPA strategies, such as negotiating with PRP steering committees and buying out de minimis PRPs, may provide incentives to delay the cleanup. The paper also designs a Bayesian mechanism for information extraction, and finds that the lump sum transfer mechanism is not always efficient. |
| 特色分类 | D82,Q28 |
| 关键词 | Environmental economics,Superfund,CERCLA,Potentially responsible parties (PRPs),Strategic information transmission,Strategic delay,Environmental remediation,Cleanup |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/information-asymmetries-uncertainties-and-cleanup-delays-at-superfund-sites/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116286 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leo K. Simon,Gordon C. Rausser,Jinhua Zhao. Information Asymmetries, Uncertainties and Cleanup Delays at Superfund Sites. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1997-087.pdf（329KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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