| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| International Environmental Agreements: Incentives and Political Economy | |
| Carlo Carraro; Domenico Siniscalco | |
| 发表日期 | 1997 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | International environmental agreements are increasingly important in a globalised economy. Beyond their specific interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition formation theory. Given the incentives to free ride, associated to the environment as a public good and to the presence of spillovers, the profitability and the optimality of environmental agreements are separated from their stability (i.e. self-enforcement): hence, a whole set of political economy issues. This paper reviews the recent advances in this area. In particular it discusses mechanisms and strategies aimed at offsetting the incentives to free ride and increasing welfare, such as transfers, issue linkages, threats and multiple agreements. The main results show that partial coalitions and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of players, and that agreements among all players are most unlikely to exist. The design of the agreements, moreover, can be crucial in determining the number of signatory countries. |
| 特色分类 | J50,D60,H23,J21,Q43 |
| 关键词 | Coalitions,International Agreements,Environment,Political Economy,Games |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/international-environmental-agreements-incentives-and-political-economy/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116295 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carlo Carraro,Domenico Siniscalco. International Environmental Agreements: Incentives and Political Economy. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1997-096.pdf（308KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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