| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Political Institutions and the Design of Environmental Policy in a Federal System with Asymmetric Information |
| Alistair Ulph
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| 发表日期 | 1998
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 1998
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Policy debates on trade and the environment frequently refer to a need for countries linked by trade to co-ordinate, or even harmonise, their purely domestic environmental policies. Underlying this argument is a concern that national governments will not fully internalise environmental externalities. Conventional trade models suggest this concern is unwarranted and harmonisation may be damaging. In this paper I consider two possible bases for this concern - strategic trade and political economy considerations - and assess the implications for the design of policy and political institutions to achieve co-ordination. A model which links these two factors suggests a possible rationale for harmonisation of environmental policies, even when countries differ significantly with respect to environmental damage costs. |
| 特色分类 | F1,H7,Q2
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| 关键词 | Environmental policy,International trade,Harmonisation,Asymmetric information,Political economy,Special interests,Restricting government discretion
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/political-institutions-and-the-design-of-environmental-policy-in-a-federal-system-with-asymmetric-information/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116303
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alistair Ulph. Political Institutions and the Design of Environmental Policy in a Federal System with Asymmetric Information. 1998.
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文件名：
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NDL1998-008.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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