| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| The Structure of International Environmental Agreements | |
| Carlo Carraro | |
| 发表日期 | 1998 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the past unsuccessful attempts, even current negotiations seem to pursue the same objective. This paper shows from a game-theoretic viewpoint that the emergence of agreements signed by all countries is quite unlikely, even in the presence of appropriate and multi-issues negotiation strategies and transfers. Either a single partial agreement or a coalition structure in which regional environmental agreements to control climate change are signed are the most likely outcomes. The paper compares these two cases and argues that regional agreements may increase both countries welfare and environmental quality. |
| 特色分类 | C72,H41,Q40,Q48 |
| 关键词 | Non-cooperative game theory,Endogenous formation of coalitions,Environmental agreements,Climate change |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-structure-of-international-environmental-agreements/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116307 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carlo Carraro. The Structure of International Environmental Agreements. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1998-012.pdf（83KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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