| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| International Games on Climate Change Control | |
| Carlo Carraro; Francesca Moriconi | |
| 发表日期 | 1998 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper an n-player non-co-operative game is used to model countries' decision of whether or not to sign an international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is also taken into account. At the equilibrium, a coalition may emerge despite the public good nature of climate. The size of the coalition depends on the degree of interdependence of countries' emission strategies, and on the type of conjectures that each country forms on the consequences of its own decision to join or to defect from the environmental coalition. |
| 特色分类 | C72,H41,Q40,Q48 |
| 关键词 | Climate change,Non co-operative game theory,Endogenous formation of coalition,Rational conjectures,International agreements |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/international-games-on-climate-change-control/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116317 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carlo Carraro,Francesca Moriconi. International Games on Climate Change Control. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1998-022.pdf（117KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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