| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| Taxes Versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant |
| Larry Karp; Michael Hoel
|
| 发表日期 | 1998
|
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
|
| 出版年 | 1998
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem in which the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and the environmental damage depends on the stock of pollution. We thus extend to a dynamic framework previous studies in which environmental damages depend on the flow of pollution. As with the static analysis, taxes are more likely to dominate quotas the greater is the curvature of the abatement cost function relative to the environmental damage function. However, in the dynamic model, an increase in the discount rate, the stock decay rate, or either the regulator's or the firms' ability to make adjustments, all increase the likelihood that taxes dominate quotas. An empirical illustration of these results suggests that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gases. |
| 特色分类 | H21,Q28
|
| 关键词 | Pollution control,Asymmetric information,Taxes and quotas,Stochastic control
|
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/taxes-versus-quotas-for-a-stock-pollutant/
|
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116324
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Larry Karp,Michael Hoel. Taxes Versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant. 1998.
|
|
文件名：
|
NDL1998-029.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
