| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Voting for Voters : A Model of Electoral Evolution | |
| Jonathan Shalev; M. Maschler; S. Barberà | |
| 发表日期 | 1998 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for a fixed number of periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is sufficient for admission, and voters can support as many candidates as they wish; voters assess the value of the streams of agents with whom they share the society, while they belong to it. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behaviour is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for friends may be postponed, and it may be advantageous to vote for enemies. We discuss the existence of different types of equilibria in pure strategies and point out interesting equilibria in mixed strategies. |
| 特色分类 | C7,D7,D71 |
| 关键词 | Voting,Elections,Clubs,Game theory,Noncooperative games,Pure-strategy equilibrium profiles,Refinements |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/voting-for-voters-a-model-of-electoral-evolution/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116330 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan Shalev,M. Maschler,S. Barberà. Voting for Voters : A Model of Electoral Evolution. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1998-035.pdf（1155KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
