| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Stable Demands and Bargaining Power in Majority Games |
| Massimo Morelli
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| 发表日期 | 1998
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 1998
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper provides a co-operative as well as a non-cooperative analysis of weighted majority games. The co-operative solution concept introduced here, the Stable Demand Set, yields a meaningful selection within the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set, it contains the Core, it eliminates the "dominated" coalition structures, and has sharp implications for weighted majority games: for such games it is non-empty, it predicts a unique stable demand vector for every homogeneous representation, and every agent within the winning coalition is expected to obtain a payoff share proportional to her relative bargaining power. The set of stable demand vectors coincides with the set of balanced aspirations defined in Bennet (1983), but it is obtained in the space of individually rational payoff configurations, rather than restricting attention to the aspirations domain. I then define two different kinds of non-cooperative coalitional bargaining games, showing that the set of Symmetric Stationary Subgames Perfect Equilibria of one of them, and the set of Subgame Perfect Equilibria of the other, have a one-to-one correspondence with the Stable Demand Set for homogeneous weighted majority games. |
| 特色分类 | C71,C72,C78
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| 关键词 | Aspirations,Demands,Bargaining set,Weighted majority games,Coalitional bargaining,Proportional payoffs
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/stable-demands-and-bargaining-power-in-majority-games/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116334
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Massimo Morelli. Stable Demands and Bargaining Power in Majority Games. 1998.
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文件名：
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NDL1998-039.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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