全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
	Rajiv Vohra; Debraj Ray
发表日期	1998
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	1998
语种	英语
摘要	Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main results are concerned with the characterisation of equilibrium coalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain conditions) an equilibrium coalition structure. Our characterisation results are especially sharp for symmetric partition functions. In particular, we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a Cournot oligopoly.
特色分类	C71,C72,C78,D62
关键词	Externalities,Bargaining,Partition function,Coalition structures
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-theory-of-endogenous-coalition-structures/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116339
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Rajiv Vohra,Debraj Ray. A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures. 1998.