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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism | |
John W. Maxwell; Thomas P. Lyon; Steven C. Hackett | |
发表日期 | 1998 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 1998 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political "entry" is costly for consumer, firms can deter it through voluntary restraints. Unlike standard entry models, deterrence is achieved by over-investing to raise the rival's welfare in the event of entry. Empirical evidence on releases of toxic chemicals shows that an increased threat of regulation (as proxied by increased membership in conservation groups) indeed induces firms to reduce toxic releases. We establish conditions under which self-regulation, if it occurs, is a Pareto improvement once costs of influencing policy are included. |
特色分类 | D72,K32,L51,Q28 |
关键词 | Regulation,Environment,Self-regulation,Political Economy |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/self-regulation-and-social-welfare-the-political-economy-of-corporate-environmentalism/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116351 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John W. Maxwell,Thomas P. Lyon,Steven C. Hackett. Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism. 1998. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL1998-055.pdf(231KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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