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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Incentives for International Environmental Cooperation: Theoretic Models and Economic Instruments | |
Carsten Schmidt | |
发表日期 | 1998 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 1998 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper surveys the rapidly growing theoretical literature on international environmental agreements. The surveyed contributions are classified according to the conceivable strategies to create incentives for the participation in and compliance with environmental conventions. The proposed taxonomy of instruments consists of (i) the choice and particular form of the internalisation instrument; (ii) carrot-stick strategies that make co-operative pollution reductions dependent on the past behaviour of other countries (internal stabilization); (iii) transfers and sanctions of various forms (external stabilization); (iv) unilateral and accompanying measures by single countries or subcoalitions; and (v) long-term provisions to increase the flexibility of agreements and to improve the framework conditions for international negotiations. |
特色分类 | D62,D7,F02,H21,Q28 |
关键词 | International environmental agreements,Co-operation,Transboundary environmental externalities,Incentive compatibility,Enforcement |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/incentives-for-international-environmental-cooperation-theoretic-models-and-economic-instruments/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116352 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carsten Schmidt. Incentives for International Environmental Cooperation: Theoretic Models and Economic Instruments. 1998. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL1998-056.pdf(196KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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