| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Transfers to Sustain Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control |
| Henry Tulkens; Marc Germain
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| 发表日期 | 1998
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 1998
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | International environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons. Important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits, and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of countries may attempt to do better for themselves outside of any proposed agreement. In a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a co-operative game, by means of appropriately defined transfers between the countries involved. However, the transboundary pollution problems that are most important are caused by accumulated pollutants so that a dynamic analysis is required. This paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context. The possibility of computing such transfers numerically is discussed. |
| 特色分类 | C73,D62,F42,H4,Q3
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| 关键词 | Transfontier pollution,Stock pollutant,Dynamic co-operative games,Coalitions,Core solution
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/transfers-to-sustain-core-theoretic-cooperation-in-international-stock-pollutant-control/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116358
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Henry Tulkens,Marc Germain. Transfers to Sustain Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control. 1998.
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文件名：
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NDL1998-062.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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