| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems | |
| Massimo Morelli | |
| 发表日期 | 1998 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides a game-theoretic model of representative democracy with endogenous party formation. Coalition formation may occur before and after elections, and the expected payoffs from the after-election majority game affect incentives to form parties before the elections. In this way Duverger's hypothesis can be formally explained by the strategic behaviour of political elites. If politicians care primarily about private benefits, the equilibrium policy outcome under a proportional electoral system coincides with the median party's position. On the othoer hand, with quasilinear utility, the distance from the median voter outcome may be lower with plurality rule. |
| 特色分类 | C7,D72 |
| 关键词 | Party formation,Electoral systems,Majoritarian bargaining,Representative democracy |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/party-formation-and-policy-outcomes-under-different-electoral-systems/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116362 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Morelli. Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1998-066.pdf（1027KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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